

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 241925Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6047

INFO USDEL ALEXANDRIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 8402

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR EG US XF

SUBJECT: SADAT MEETING WITH CODEL OBEY

1. PRESIDENT SADAT MET FOR ONE HOUR AUG. 24 WITH CONGRESSMEN OBEY, KOCH AND EARLY OF HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE. AMBASSADOR WAS PRESENT BUT HAS NOT SEEN THIS MESSAGE. CONGRESSMEN HAVE CLEARED IT.

2. OBEY EXPRESSED CODEL'S APPRECIATION FOR MEETING IN VIEW OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS AND ADMIRATION FOR SUEZ RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT WHICH CODEL HAD SEEN PREVIOUS DAY. HE SAID MOST MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WERE IMPRESSED WITH SADAT'S MOVES TOWARD PEACE. HE PREDICTED THAT ANTICIPATED

AGREEMENT WOULD BE CAREFULLY DISCUSSED IN CONGRESS, PARTICULARLY PRESENCE OF AMERICAN CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS. SADAT SAID ISRAELIS WERE VERY INSISTENT ON TECHNICIANS' PRESENCE, PERHAPS TO MAKE U.S. A THIRD PARTY TO THE ACCORD. EGYPT HAD NO OBJECTION TO CIVILIAN U.S. TECHNICIANS AND EVEN WELCOMED IDEA, BUT WOULD NOT AGREE TO MILITARY TECHNICIANS. OBEY THEN EXPRESSED CONCERN OF FULBRIGHT AND OTHERS THAT IF ANTICIPATED AGREEMENT NOT FOLLOWED UP QUICKLY, RETURN TO DANGEROUS STALEMATE OF PAST COULD OCCUR. OBEY SAID SOME EGYPTIANS HAD MENTIONED 3-6 MONTS AS TIME FRAME FOR STEPS WITH SYRIA. SADAT SAID THIS WAS "TOO LONG,"
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NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA WERE ESSENTIAL "AS SOON AS

POSSIBLE." JORDAN AND PALESTINIANS COULD WAIT A WHILE LONGER. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS NO FURTHER PROGRESS WITH SYRIA, SADAT SAID, ATTACKS UPON EGYPT FROM PALESTINIANS AND OTHERS WILL GROW EVEN WORSE. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT USSR WOULD PUSH SYRIA INTO ACTION, BUT SADAT BELIEVES USSR DESIRE TO AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH U.S. WOULD PREVENT THIS. USSR IS, HOWEVER, INSTIGATOR OF CURRENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST HIM. HE REITERATED THAT SYRIA MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO DESPAIR AND THAT HE BELIEVED SECRETARY KISSINGER WELL AWARE OF THIS.

3. OBEY ASKED WHAT WERE EGYPT'S EXPECTATIONS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE. SADAT REPLIED THAT U.S. HAD NEGLECTED ARABS FOR MANY YEARS DESPITE THE FACT THAT 99 PERCENT OF U.S. INTERESTS IN THE ME ARE IN ARAB COUNTRIES. HE SAID EGYPT WANTED FINANCING FACILITIES FROM U.S. AND ITS ALLIES TO RESOLVE ITS SHORT TERM LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS. IT ALSO WELCOMED JOINT VENTURES IN INDUSTRY AND OTHER SECTORS SUCH AS THOSE WITH FNCB AND CHASE MANHATTAN THAT WILL OPEN THIS FALL. HE ALSO WANTED TO PURCHASE DEFENSIVE MILITARY EQUIPMENT. SINCE OCTOBER WAR SYRIA HAS BEEN REARMED AND ISRAEL EVEN MORE SO, BUT NOT EGYPT. FROM CEASE FIRE TO JANUARY 1975 EGYPT RECEIVED NOTHING FROM USSR. IN JANUARY 1975 USSR BEGAN FILLING SOME PRE-WAR ORDERS, BUT THIS LASTED ONLY UNTIL MARCH 1975. SADAT SAID HE WOULD THEREFORE BE OBLIGED TO REQUEST U.S. SELL HIM SOME DEFENSIVE WEAPONS (HE MENTIONED TOW ANTI-TANK MISSILES, F-5ES, ELECTRONIC DEVICES, AND MATERIEL FOR NAVY WHICH HAS OVER 2,000 KMS OF COAST TO DEFEND). HE SAID HE HAD RECENTLY BEEN FORCED TO STATION SOME NAVY UNITS ON COAST NEAR LIBYAN BORDER BECAUSE OF SOVIET ARMS DEAL WITH LIBYA. SADAT EMPHASIZED THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT TO HAVE ARMS EQUAL TO ISRAEL, BUT U.S. SHOULD AT LEAST ALLOW HIM TO BUY ENOUGH DEFENSIVE ARMS SO HE WOULD NOT BE "STRANGLERED." SADAT STRESSED THAT RUSSIANS ARE PRESSURING EGYPT IN MANY WAYS BESIDES ARMS AND SPARE PARTS, BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT BE DEFLECTED FROM SEARCH FOR PEACE. HE HAD NOW CANCELLED SOVIET USE OF FACILITIES AT ALL EGYPTIAN PORTS.

4. OBEY ASKED WHAT MAGNITUDE OF ARMS SADAT HAD IN
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MIND AND WHAT LEVELS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH USG OFFICIALS. SADAT SAID HE HAD NOT YET DISCUSSED THIS WITH USG, PREFERRING TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER CURRENT AGREEMENT CONCLUDED WHEN CLIMATE WOULD BE BETTER. WHEN OBEY PERSISTED AS TO LIKELY AMOUNTS INVOLVED SADAT SAID HIS REQUEST WOULD BE "VERY HUMBLE, VERY REASONABLE, NOT BILLIONS LIKE ISRAEL." HE COULDN'T SPEND THAT MUCH ON ARMS BECAUSE HIS OTHER NEEDS WERE TOO GREAT. HE ONLY WANTED TO MEET "IMMEDIATE NEEDS" SO HE WOULD NOT

BE SO WEAK THAT ISRAELIS WOULD "AGAIN BECOME ARROGANT WITH ME."

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 241925Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6048

INFO USDEL ALEXANDRIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 CAIRO 8402

EXDIS

5. KOCH CONGRATULATED SADAT FOR BEING MOST EFFECTIVE ARAB SPOKESMAN HE HAS SEEN ON AMERICAN TV. HE SAID HE VIEWED PROBLEM AS ARAB VS. ISRAELI NOT ARAB VS. JEW AND REMARKED THAT HERE NOW SEEMS TO BE SOME ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF STATE OF ISRAEL. SADAT SAID THIS WAS CORRECT AND IT IS ONLY SINCE OCTOBER WAR. KOCH ASKED IF FACE TO FACE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT NOT SOON BE POSSIBLE TO HELP OVERCOME MISTRUST AND NARROW GAP BETWEEN ISRAELI AND ARAB PRECEPTIONS. SADAT SAID HE HAD NO CONFIDENCE WHATSOEVER IN ISRAELIS, PARTICULARLY AFTER LAST MARCH WHEN THEY REFUSED AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO GAIN TIME. FURTHERMORE, HOW COULD HE EXPLAIN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS TO HIS PEOPLE WITH ISRAEL OCCUPYING ARAB LANDS AND RABIN LAYING DOWN CONDITIONS? HE BELIEVES ISRAELIS ARE CONFUSED AND THAT RABIN IS WEAK BOTH POLITICALLY AND AS A LEADER. SADAT SAID END OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCY MUST COME BEFORE MORE NORMAL EXCHANGES AND IT SHOULD COME THROUGH OFFICIAL AGREEMENTS AND WITH UN AND OTHER GUARANTEES. HE HIMSELF WOULD BE ASKING FOR SOME GUARANTEES. AFTER THIS STAGE IS REACHED THERE WILL BE A COMPLETELY NEW ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH MANY THINGS CAN HAPPEN. SADAT SAID WE MUST BE REALISTIC, NOT DREAMERS. EGYPT MUST DEAL WITH THE U.S. BECUASE "100 PERCENT OF THE CARDS" FOR A SETTLEMENT ARE IN THE U.S. HANDS. ISRAELIS, ON OTHER HAND, HAVE LOST THEIR HEADS AS ILLUSTRATED BY CURRENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN JERUSALEM AGAINST SECRETARY. HE SAID THEY CANNOT

ACCEPT THE POST-1973 REALITY AND ARE STILL "ARROGANT,
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POWER HUNGRY AND UNABLE TO MAKE PEACE."

6. ON PALESTINIANS, SADAT SAID THEY ARE VERY FURIOUS AT HIM BECAUSE OF ANTICIPATED ACCORD, BUT THAT WHEN THEY ARE RECOGNIZED BY U.S. AND ALLOWED TO SIT IN ON NEGOTIATIONS THEY WILL CHANGE. THEY WILL ALSO BECOME MORE REALISTIC IF THEY "START WITH" WEST BANK AND GAZA AS PALESTINE STATE AND EXPERIENCE PROBLEMS OF STATEHOOD. WHEN KOCH SAID ISRAELIS WOULD REACT SHARPLY TO TERM "START WITH", SADAT MERELY SAID PALESTINIANS WOULD CHANGE WITH TIME AND RECOGNITION.

7. KOCH ASKED WHAT EGYPT WOULD DO IN EVENT OF SYRIAN-ISRAELI FIGHTING. SADAT SAID IF ISRAEL ATTACKED SYRIA, EGYPT COULD NOT STAY OUT. IF SYRIA ATTACKS ISRAEL, IT WOULD BE DIFFERENT STORY. HE DID NOT EXPECT SUCH EVENTUALITY BECAUSE SYRIA KNOWS IT CAN DO NOTHING WITHOUT EGYPT AND WOULD BE ELIMINATED IN 48 HOURS BY ISRAELIS. FURTHERMORE, SOVIETS WANT TO AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH U.S. AND WOULD DISCOURAGE SYRIA. ONLY IF ISRAEL IS ATTACKER WOULD EGYPT BE IN, PRESIDENT SAID. KOCH AGAIN URGED FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS AND SADAT SAID "DON'T ASK ME TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WHILE THEY OCCUPY MY LAND."

8. OBEY ASKED IF SINAI WOULD BE DEMILITARIZED AND KOCH ASKED HOW ISRAEL COULD AGREE TO WITHDRAW TO 1967 BORDERS WITHOUT PRIOR ASSURANCE OF PEACE SINCE IT WOULD PUT EGYPT WITHIN EASY STRIKING DISTANCE OF TEL AVIV. SADAT SAID HE WOULD AGREE TO MUTUAL DEMILITARIZATION ON BORDERS. WHEN KOCH SAID THIS STILL LEFT TEL AVIV EXPOSED, SADAT SAID HE WOULD AGREE TO 10 KMS DEMILITARIZATION FOR EVERY 1 KM ISRAEL AGREED TO (N.B. THIS IS ONLY STATEMENT SADAT DID NOT WANT QUOTED SINCE HE SAID ISRAELIS WOULD SEIZE IT AS BEGINNING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS).

9. CONGRESSMAN EARLY EXPRESSED DEEP RESPECT FOR SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVES. HE SAID HE WOULD BE ASKED TO VOTE FOR FUNDS FOR ISRAEL, INCLUDING COMPENSATION FOR RETURN OF OIL FIELDS, AND ASKED HOW EGYPT WOULD VIEW THIS FINANCING IN THE FUTURE, PARTICULARLY IF IT IS TO BE CONTINUING. SADAT SAID HE IS NOT ASKING U.S. TO END ITS "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH ISRAEL. EGYPT CAN STILL HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH U.S.
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ALTHOUGH NEVER RECEIVING AS MUCH AID. EGYPT DOES NOT OBJECT TO THIS SITUATION AS LONG AS ISRAEL RETURNS TO 1967 BORDERS.

10. SADAT CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE IS LIVING AMERICAN SITUATION AS HE IS LIVING ISRAELI SITUATION IN ORDER TO REACH THE RIGHT DECISIONS. HE THEREFORE RECOGNIZES THAT THERE CAN BE NO BIG USG DECISIONS IN ELECTION YEAR AND THAT IS WHY HE HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO RENEW UNEF FOR ONE YEAR IN OCTOBER 1975 AND FOR ANOTHER YEAR IN OCTOBER 1976. BUT IN SUMMER OF '77 WHEN NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL BE INSTALLED "I WILL BE ASKING YOU TO START YOUR EFFORTS AGAIN." HE STRESSED THAT EGYPTIAN PEOPLE WANT PEACE AS SHOWN BY IMMEDIATE RETURN OF 600,000 EGYPTIANS TO THE CANAL ZONE AFTER REOPENING OF CANAL.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CODELS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 24 AUG 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975CAIRO08402
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750293-0214
From: CAIRO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750822/aaaaatbr.tel
Line Count: 238
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 05 AUG 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <05 AUG 2003 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <28 NOV 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SADAT MEETING WITH CODEL OBEY
TAGS: PFOR, EG, US, XF, (OBEY, DAVID R), (SADAT, ANWAR)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006